Food and Hydration: A Natural Law Perspective | Fr. Jack Healy O. Carm. | Homiletic & Pastoral Review
Hearing about “health care proxies,” “living wills,” “durable power of attorney” can be somewhat baffling to the ordinary person, especially to the person of faith.1 For he or she knows that these legal instruments are meant to address end-of-life care which, owing to the advances in technology, raises not only medical but ethical issues, as well. One such issue concerns the administration of food and hydration to the terminally ill, or to the dying. I would like to address that issue within the ethical framework of natural law theory which, it is to be noted, seems to be enjoying a certain resurgence even in the legal community. In that community, two prominent names come to mind: John Finnis of Oxford, and Robert George of Princeton;2 though not to be ignored are Robert Bork, and Hadley Arkes;3 and, as we know from their confirmation hearings, Justices Scalia and Thomas.
If anything, natural law theory, with its pedigree reaching back to ancient times, is eminently rational and coherent, owing to the genius of the 13th century philosopher and theologian, St. Thomas Aquinas. Such was his systematic approach to natural law that, thereafter, no comprehensive treatment of the topic ever omits his name. In his Summa Theologica, Prima Secundae, he addresses natural law in the course of treating law as such [qss. 91-95] , and then throughout the Summa, treats other key components of the theory, like the nature of the “good,” or of freedom, or of justice, or of personhood, or of a moral act. To be noted is St. Thomas’ handling of specific moral issues, like that of killing in self-defense (qs.64. a.7), and that of suicide (ibidem, a.5), which yield distinctions still in play today and, as we will see, relevant for our topic on nutrition and hydration.
I believe that the lynch pin of natural law theory is found in its presupposition that every creature, according to its make-up, that is, its nature, seeks its own fulfillment. The creature strives to realize to the full what it is constitutionally. All natures below man do so instinctively. While man, with the peculiarity of a nature comprised of free will and intellect must—notwithstanding his lower functionings—choose that which will fulfill and perfect his nature. This inherent drive, or dynamism, found in a thing makes its behavior inherently purposeful which, according to Aristotle, equates with its “good.” That is, relative to a thing’s nature, purpose and good are synonymous, so that in achieving the purpose of its being, a thing is simultaneously realizing its good. Hence, Aristotle’s definition, “good is that toward which all things aim.”
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