Schall on Aristotelian Principles

From the First Principles ISI Web Journal:

The corpus of Aristotle’s works, of course, is full of principles, first and otherwise. In one sense, to cite all the “principles,” even in book one of Aristotle’s Ethics, would simply be to copy out every line, principle on principle. But every time I read this book, I am struck by certain “principles” that Aristotle marks or underscores there, almost, it seems, in passing. Here, I do not propose a review or summary of this famous book one. Rather, I want to comment on several “principles” that struck me on my, what, hundredth reading of this book. Aristotle, the more familiar he is, the newer, the more insightful he seems to be.

Early in the first chapter, speaking of what method to use in understanding things of ethical action, Aristotle admonishes us: “We do not seek the same degree of exactness in all sorts of argument alike, any more than in the products of different crafts” (1094b14–15). Ethical things are shot through with contingency and human freedom. Moral actions are true “for the most part.” To expect more certitude of something than its subject matter permits is tantamount to not understanding what it is we deal with or talk about in our ordinary actions. We always confront actions of ours that might well have been “otherwise,” different from what they turned out to be.

Aristotle is aware that this variety in human actions can at first seem like no natural law or norm exists. All seems arbitrary. “Now, fine and just things, which political science examines, differ and vary so much as to seem to rest on convention only, not on nature.” With this, however, he is not saying that they are merely “conventional,” infinitely variable with no order. Aristotle has a happy way of stating the same position in another way: “For the educated person seeks exactness (certitude) in each area to the extent that the nature of the subject allows, for apparently it is just as mistaken to demand demonstrations from a rhetorician as to accept merely persuasive arguments from a mathematician” (1094b24–26). To expect mathematical exactitude of human action is not to understand either the subject matter of mathematics or human action.

In a large class of good students, it is always something of a provocative delight to have them read, at twenty years old, what Aristotle thinks of their understanding of political things. “This is why a youth is not a suitable student of political science; for he lacks experience of the actions in life, which are the subject and premises of our arguments. Moreover, since he tends to follow his feelings, his study will be futile and useless; for the end of political science is action, not knowledge” (1095a2–5).

Read more. It's encouraging to hear that Georgetown still has large classes of good students...