Did this reviewer even read "Caritas in veritate"?

I've read some interesting interpretations and controversial opinions about Pope Benedict XVI's most recent encyclical, "Charity in Truth," but a column titled, "Pope's plea for love to replace trade is a dream" (YumaSun.com, Sept. 25, 2009), by Tibor R. Machan, who teaches at Chapman University and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, is simply bewildering, not to mention rather hysterical and flatly incorrect on several counts.

Here are three of the more bizarre assertions/insinuations made by Machan:

1. Pope Benedict XVI is an avowed enemy of the free market and economic liberty, and a Sixties-styled, pie-in-the-sky, neo-hippie to boot:

With everyone confused about how much free-market capitalism has to do with the economic mess, now is the time for enemies of economic liberty to rise up and seize the day! That way they may get some mileage out of it for their ongoing mission to prepare people for being ruled, managed, regimented and regulated by, you guessed it, them!

In his recent book, "Caritas in Veritate: On Integral Human Development in Charity and Truth" (Ignatius Press, 2009), we are implored by the Pope to love all, instead of trade, as if this really were possible among billions of people.

Such dreaming has done terrible damage to humanity for centuries, so why should the Pope not buy into it? The kind of Christian love the Pope is promoting seems to him to be anathema to free markets. His reason? That the pursuit of profit precludes love among human beings.

Wrong, wrong, wrong. But don't take my word for it; simply consider a few passages from the encyclical:

• "The Church has always held that economic action is not to be regarded as something opposed to society. In and of itself, the market is not, and must not become, the place where the strong subdue the weak. Society does not have to protect itself from the market, as if the development of the latter were ipso facto to entail the death of authentically human relations. Admittedly, the market can be a negative force, not because it is so by nature, but because a certain ideology can make it so. It must be remembered that the market does not exist in the pure state. It is shaped by the cultural configurations which define it and give it direction. Economy and finance, as instruments, can be

used badly when those at the helm are motivated by purely selfish ends. Instruments that are good in themselves can thereby be transformed into harmful ones. But it is man's darkened reason that produces these consequences, not the instrument per se. Therefore it is not the instrument that must be called to account, but individuals, their moral conscience and their personal and social responsibility." (par. 36)

• "The Church's social doctrine has always maintained that justice must be applied to every phase of economic activity, because this is always concerned with man and his needs. Locating resources, financing, production, consumption and all the other phases in the economic cycle inevitably have moral implications. Thus every economic decision has a moral consequence. The social sciences and the direction taken by the contemporary economy point to the same conclusion. Perhaps at one time it was conceivable that first the creation of wealth could be entrusted to the economy, and then the task of distributing it could be assigned to politics. Today that would be more difficult, given that economic activity is no longer circumscribed within territorial limits, while the authority of governments continues to be principally local. Hence the canons of justice must be respected from the outset, as the economic process unfolds, and not just afterwards or incidentally. Space also needs to be created within the market for economic activity carried out by subjects who freely choose to act according to principles other than those of pure profit, without sacrificing the production of economic value in the process. The many economic entities that draw their origin from religious and lay initiatives demonstrate that this is concretely possible." (par. 37)

• "What is needed, therefore, is a market that permits the free operation, in conditions of equal opportunity, of enterprises in pursuit of different institutional ends. Alongside profit-oriented private enterprise and the various types of public enterprise, there must be room for commercial entities based on mutualist principles and pursuing social ends to take root and express themselves. It is from their reciprocal encounter in the marketplace that one may expect hybrid forms of commercial behaviour to emerge, and hence an attentiveness to ways of civilizing the economy. Charity in truth, in this case, requires that shape and structure be given to those types of economic initiative which, without rejecting profit, aim at a higher goal than the mere logic of the exchange of equivalents, of profit as an end in itself." (par. 38)

One of Benedict's essential points throughout the encyclical, as these quotes indicate, is that economies and markets do not exist in a vacuum, but involve real people making decisions based on ethics and principles. Thus, it behooves us to consider the ethical—and, ultimately, theological—basis for economic decisions and market-place activities. Talk of "free trade" can sound wonderful, but it also begs important questions: free in what way? To do what? With what limits, if any? For what end? To what purpose? And so forth.

2. Benedict's understanding of love is not only naive and hopelessly idealistic, it is essentially Marxist and embarrassingly utopian in character:

What the Pope and the reviewer of his book miss is that love cannot be spread thin across the world, not even across the marketplace. Trade does respect individual sovereignty and thus shows a certain sensible measure of love for others.

But the deeper love that the Pope and so many others, among them most notably Karl Marx, demand of us all (in opposition to self-love and a measured respect we show other people in the course of trade) is impossible except among intimates - family, friends, maybe some comrades in arms and colleagues.

That kind of love requires detailed knowledge of others, and such knowledge is simply unavailable to us except about very few other people (not all of whom, moreover, will deserve our love).

The dreamers, like the Pope and his allies, would destroy genuine, realistically possible love of some few people for the sake of the shallow kind professed by politicians and celebrities.

This is so far off the mark is it essentially slanderous; not only does Machan fail to accurately present what Benedict states in Caritas in veritate, it's safe to say he hasn't paid much, if any, attention to Deus caritas est, the Holy Father's encyclical on the nature and meaning of love. Again, a few quotes from the recent encyclical present a decidedly different picture:

• "Another important consideration is the common good. To love someone is to desire that person's good and to take effective steps to secure it. Besides the good of the individual, there is a good that is linked to living in society: the common good. It is the good of “all of us”, made up of individuals, families and intermediate groups who together constitute society[4]. It is a good that is sought not for its own sake, but for the people who belong to the social community and who can only really and effectively pursue their good within it. To desire the common good and strive towards it is a requirement of justice and charity. To take a stand for the common good is on the one hand to be solicitous for, and on the other hand to avail oneself of, that complex of institutions that give structure to the life of society, juridically, civilly, politically and culturally, making it the pólis, or “city”. The more we strive to secure a common good corresponding to the real needs of our neighbours, the more effectively we love them. Every Christian is called to practise this charity, in a manner corresponding to his vocation and according to the degree of influence he wields in the pólis. This is the institutional path — we might also call it the political path — of charity, no less excellent and effective than the kind of charity which encounters the neighbour directly, outside the institutional mediation of the pólis. When animated by charity, commitment to the common good has greater worth than a merely secular and political stand would have. Like all commitment to justice, it has a place within the testimony of divine charity that paves the way for eternity through temporal action. Man's earthly activity, when inspired and sustained by charity, contributes to the building of the universal city of God, which is the goal of the history of the human family. In an increasingly globalized society, the common good and the effort to obtain it cannot fail to assume the dimensions of the whole human family, that is to say, the community of peoples and nations[5], in such a way as to shape the earthly city in unity and peace, rendering it to some degree an anticipation and a prefiguration of the undivided city of God." (par. 7)

• "Love in truth — caritas in veritate — is a great challenge for the Church in a world that is becoming progressively and pervasively globalized. The risk for our time is that the de facto interdependence of people and nations is not matched by ethical interaction of consciences and minds that would give rise to truly human development. Only in charity, illumined by the light of reason and faith, is it possible to pursue development goals that possess a more humane and humanizing value. The sharing of goods and resources, from which authentic development proceeds, is not guaranteed by merely technical progress and relationships of utility, but by the potential of love that overcomes evil with good (cf. Rom 12:21), opening up the path towards reciprocity of consciences and liberties." (par. 9)

•  In this context, the theme of integral human development takes on an even broader range of meanings: the correlation between its multiple elements requires a commitment to foster the interaction of the different levels of human knowledge in order to promote the authentic development of peoples. Often it is thought that development, or the socio-economic measures that go with it, merely require to be implemented through joint action. This joint action, however, needs to be given direction, because “all social action involves a doctrine”[74]. In view of the complexity of the issues, it is obvious that the various disciplines have to work together through an orderly interdisciplinary exchange. Charity does not exclude knowledge, but rather requires, promotes, and animates it from within. Knowledge is never purely the work of the intellect. It can certainly be reduced to calculation and experiment, but if it aspires to be wisdom capable of directing man in the light of his first beginnings and his final ends, it must be “seasoned” with the “salt” of charity. Deeds without knowledge are blind, and knowledge without love is sterile. Indeed, “the individual who is animated by true charity labours skilfully to discover the causes of misery, to find the means to combat it, to overcome it resolutely”[75]. Faced with the phenomena that lie before us, charity in truth requires first of all that we know and understand, acknowledging and respecting the specific competence of every level of knowledge. Charity is not an added extra, like an appendix to work already concluded in each of the various disciplines: it engages them in dialogue from the very beginning. The demands of love do not contradict those of reason. Human knowledge is insufficient and the conclusions of science cannot indicate by themselves the path towards integral human development. There is always a need to push further ahead: this is what is required by charity in truth[76]. Going beyond, however, never means prescinding from the conclusions of reason, nor contradicting its results. Intelligence and love are not in separate compartments: love is rich in intelligence and intelligence is full of love." (par. 30)

Machan's limited, flawed understanding of charity—which sounds basically like a crude form of tribalism—cannot account for the selfless work done by people such as Mother Theresa, doctors, nurses, volunteers, counselors, and many, many others whose work is animated by love for people they will, in the vast majority of cases, never know intimately. Benedict addresses this significant point at length in the opening part of Deus caritas est:

In the gradual unfolding of this encounter, it is clearly revealed that love is not merely a sentiment. Sentiments come and go. A sentiment can be a marvellous first spark, but it is not the fullness of love. Earlier we spoke of the process of purification and maturation by which eros comes fully into its own, becomes love in the full meaning of the word. It is characteristic of mature love that it calls into play all man's potentialities; it engages the whole man, so to speak. Contact with the visible manifestations of God's love can awaken within us a feeling of joy born of the experience of being loved. But this encounter also engages our will and our intellect. Acknowledgment of the living God is one path towards love, and the “yes” of our will to his will unites our intellect, will and sentiments in the all- embracing act of love. But this process is always open-ended; love is never “finished” and complete; throughout life, it changes and matures, and thus remains faithful to itself. Idem velle atque idem nolle [9]—to want the same thing, and to reject the same thing—was recognized by antiquity as the authentic content of love: the one becomes similar to the other, and this leads to a community of will and thought. The love-story between God and man consists in the very fact that this communion of will increases in a communion of thought and sentiment, and thus our will and God's will increasingly coincide: God's will is no longer for me an alien will, something imposed on me from without by the commandments, but it is now my own will, based on the realization that God is in fact more deeply present to me than I am to myself.[10] Then self- abandonment to God increases and God becomes our joy (cf. Ps 73 [72]:23-28).

Love of neighbour is thus shown to be possible in the way proclaimed by the Bible, by Jesus. It consists in the very fact that, in God and with God, I love even the person whom I do not like or even know. This can only take place on the basis of an intimate encounter with God, an encounter which has become a communion of will, even affecting my feelings. Then I learn to look on this other person not simply with my eyes and my feelings, but from the perspective of Jesus Christ. His friend is my friend. Going beyond exterior appearances, I perceive in others an interior desire for a sign of love, of concern. This I can offer them not only through the organizations intended for such purposes, accepting it perhaps as a political necessity. Seeing with the eyes of Christ, I can give to others much more than their outward necessities; I can give them the look of love which they crave. Here we see the necessary interplay between love of God and love of neighbour which the First Letter of John speaks of with such insistence. If I have no contact whatsoever with God in my life, then I cannot see in the other anything more than the other, and I am incapable of seeing in him the image of God. But if in my life I fail completely to heed others, solely out of a desire to be “devout” and to perform my “religious duties”, then my relationship with God will also grow arid. It becomes merely “proper”, but loveless. Only my readiness to encounter my neighbour and to show him love makes me sensitive to God as well. Only if I serve my neighbour can my eyes be opened to what God does for me and how much he loves me. The saints—consider the example of Blessed Teresa of Calcutta—constantly renewed their capacity for love of neighbour from their encounter with the Eucharistic Lord, and conversely this encounter acquired its real- ism and depth in their service to others. Love of God and love of neighbour are thus inseparable, they form a single commandment. But both live from the love of God who has loved us first. No longer is it a question, then, of a “commandment” imposed from without and calling for the impossible, but rather of a freely-bestowed experience of love from within, a love which by its very nature must then be shared with others. Love grows through love. Love is “divine” because it comes from God and unites us to God; through this unifying process it makes us a “we” which transcends our divisions and makes us one, until in the end God is “all in all” (1 Cor 15:28). (par 17-18)

Without moorings in transcendent love and objective truth, human love can easily falls into overt sentimentality or vague generalizations about "loving humanity", both of which involve strong emotions and lofty rhetoric without a concrete, willed basis from which to judge and act.

3. Benedict, being an "idealist," doesn't understand the real nature and purpose of markets and trade:

Trade, contrary to what is intimated by these idealists, by no means precludes genuine love among people. It doesn't insist, admittedly, that all who trade ought to love one another. The trade relationship is sensibly limited in scope - when you go shopping you need not get involved in the butcher's family life, the car dealers hobbies or the dentist's personal problems.

It is friends and relatives who do that, not those who populate the marketplace for the limited purpose of striking a good deal. And that purpose not only does not preclude pursuing friendship and other intimacies elsewhere but makes that pursuit economically possible, affordable, if you will.

As a saying I like so much states, "The perfect is the enemy of the good." Markets are not the highest of human institutions, but they are excellent for the purpose for which most of us use them.

This, of course, is based on a caricature of what Benedict actually states about all of these topics, especially the nature of authentic charity. In addition, the final paragraph above undoes most of what Machan has attempted to argue. "Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien", from Voltaire's Dictionnaire Philosophique (1764), holds some water when it comes to purely natural entities and human relationships (something discovered, for example, by those newlyweds who think married life will be a perfect dream). But Benedict's argument might well be rendered: "The Perfect is the source of the good." This is does not mean that utopia can be achieved within history; it does mean that man is free to choose charity and goodness when making economic-related decisions: "The Church's social doctrine holds that authentically human social relationships of friendship, solidarity and reciprocity can also be conducted within economic activity, and not only outside it or 'after' it. The economic sphere is neither ethically neutral, nor inherently inhuman and opposed to society. It is part and parcel of human activity and precisely because it is human, it must be structured and governed in an ethical manner" (par. 36).

And Benedict would surely agree that markets are not the highest of human institutions; they can be very good, but we should keep in mind that "Instruments that are good in themselves can thereby be transformed into harmful ones" (par. 36). In the end, the market should be about what is truly good for man—not simply as a consumer, but mostly as a creature made by God and for God, with an eternal destiny: "I would like to remind everyone, especially governments engaged in boosting the world's economic and social assets, that the primary capital to be safeguarded and valued is man, the human person in his or her integrity: 'Man is the source, the focus and the aim of all economic and social life'.” (par. 25; the quote is from Gaudium et Spes, 63).

Related Ignatius Insight Links and Articles:

• CWR Round-Table: Caritas in Veritate | Catholic World Report
• Open to Transcendence, Open to Life | Fr. Joseph Fessio, S.J.
• Caritas in Veritate: "Its Principal Driving Force" | Fr. James V. Schall, S.J.
• Benedict XVI's Theological Vision: An Introduction | Monsignor Joseph Murphy | From the introduction to Christ, Our Joy: The Theological Vision of Pope Benedict XVI
• Pope Benedict XVI, Theologian of Joy | Monsignor Joseph Murphy | An interview with the author of Christ, Our Joy: The Theological Vision of Pope Benedict XVI
• Spe Salvi and Vatican II | Brian A. Graebe

Comments

[Rich Leonardi]

If I'm not mistaken, Tibor Machan is a devotee of Ayn Rand, who generally spent more time demonizing her adversaries than engaging their arguments. It's an unfortunate habit that has been picked up by her followers.

[Tibor R. Machan]

While Tibor Machan [that is, I] certainly has found much to be valued in the works of Ayn Rand--even wrote a little book on her--he has also laid out the case for various aspects of neo-Aristotelian philosophy and free market capitalism on his very own. You can check for yourself:

Single Author Books[31]:
The promise of liberty: a non-utopian vision (Lexington Books, 2008).
Ayn Rand, Ihr Werk (Grevenbroich, DE:Lichtschlag Medien und Werbung KGm 2008)
The Georgia Lectures (Berlin, DE: Friedrich Neuman Foundation, 2007)
The Right Road to Radical Freedom (Imprint Academic, 2007)
The Morality of Business: A Profession for Wealthcare (New York: Springer, 2007)
Libertarianism Defended (Ashgate, 2006)
Libertarianism, For and Against, w/C. Duncan (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005)
The Man Without a Hobby (Hamilton Books, 2004)
Objectivity: Recovering Determinate Reality (London, UK: Ashgate, 2004)
Neither Left nor Right, Selected Columns (Hoover Institution Press, 2004)
Putting Humans First, Why We Are Nature’s Favorites (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004)
The Liberty Option (Imprint Academic, 2003)
The Passion for Liberty (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003)
The Right to Private Property (Hoover Institution Pres, 2002)
A Primer on Business Ethics w/J. Chesher (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002)
Initiative: Human Agency and Society (Hoover Institution Press, 2000)
Ayn Rand (Peter Lang, 2000)
The Business of Commerce w/J. Chesher (Hoover Institution Press, 1999)
Classical Individualism (Routledge, 1998)
Generosity; Virtue in the Civil Society (Cato Institute, 1998)
Why Freedom Must be First (Hoover Institution Press, 1997)
A Primer on Ethics (University of Oklahoma Press, 1997)
Private Rights & Public Illusions (Transaction, 1995).
The Virtue of Liberty (Foundation for Economic Education, 1994).
Liberalisme, Ethique et Valuers Morales (Institut Euro 92, 1993).
Capitalism and Individualism: Reframing the Argument for the Free Society
(St. Martin's Publ. Co. & Harvester Wheatsheaf Books, 1990).
A Dialogue Partly on Political Liberty [w/J. N. Nelson] (University Press
of American, 1990)
Liberty and Culture: Essays on the Idea of a Free Society (Prometheus
Books, 1989).
Individuals and Their Rights (Open Court, 1989).
Marxism: A Bourgeois Critique (MCB University Press Limited, 1988).
The Moral Case for the Free Market Economy (The Edwin Mellen Press,
1989, rev. [English] version of Freedom Philosophy).
Freedom Philosophy (AB Timbro, 1987).
Introduction to Philosophical Inquiries (Allyn & Bacon, 1977;
University Press of America, 1985).
Human Rights and Human Liberties (Nelson-Hall, 1975).
The Pseudo-Science of B.F. Skinner (Arlington House, 1973; Hamilton Books, 2006).

Edited Books[17]:
Anarchism/Minarchism (w/R. Long) (Ashgate, 2007)
Ayn Rand at 100 (New Delhi, India: Pragun Publication, 2006)
Liberty & Justice (Hoover Institution Press, 2006)
Liberty and R&D (Hoover Institution Press, 2002)
Liberty & Equality (Hoover Institution Press, 2002)
Liberty & Democracy (Hoover Institution Press, 2002)
Liberty and Hard Cases (Hoover Institution Press, 2001)
Individual Rights Reconsidered (Hoover Institution Press, 2001)
The Commons: Its Tragedy and Other Follies (Hoover Institution Press, 2001)
Morality & Work (Hoover Institution Press, 2000)
Education in a Free Society (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000)
Business Ethics in the Global Market (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1999)
Political Philosophy: Essential Selections [w/A. Skoble] (Prentice Hall, 1998)
Liberty for the 21st Century [w/D. B. Rasmussen] (Rowman & Littlefield, 1995)
Commerce and Morality (Rowman and Littlefield, 1988).
The Main Debate: Communism vs. Capitalism (Random House, 1987).
Recent Work in Philosophy [w/K. G. Lucey] (Rowman & Allanheld, 1983).
Rights and Regulation [with M. Bruce Johnson] (Ballinger, 1983).
The Libertarian Reader (Rowman & Littlefield, 1982).
The Libertarian Alternative (Nelson-Hall, 1974)

Invited Essays/Chapters in Books (Originals & Reprints [70+])
“Capitalism and Freedom,” in D. James, ed., Outside Looking In (NY: Harper & Row, 1972).
“On the Possibility of Objectivity and Moral Determinants in Scientific Change,” in
Karen D. Knorr, et al., eds., Determinants and Controls of Scientific Development
(Boston, MA: D. Reidel, 1975).
“Naturalism, Values and the Social Sciences,” in W. Leinfellner, et al., eds.,
Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Critical Rationalism (Kirchberg-an-Wechsel,
Austria: Austrian Wittgenstein Congress, 1978).
“Reason, Morality, and the Free Society,” in R. L. Cunningham, ed., Liberty and the
Rule of Law (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1979).
“Human Rights,” in S. J. Fodero, ed., The Academic American Encyclopedia
(Baltimore, MD: Arete, 1980).
“Human Rights, Political Change and Feudalism,” in A. Rosenbaum, ed., Philosophies
of Human Rights (Greenwich, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981).
“The Petty Tyrannies of Government Regulation,” in T. Machan and M. Bruce
Johnson, eds., Rights & Regulation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1983), 259-88.
“Should Business Be Regulated?” in T. Regan, ed., Just Business (NY: Random House, 1983).
“Pollution and Political Theory,” in T. Regan, ed., Earthbound (NY: Random House, 1984).
“Gewirth and the Supportive State,” with D. Den Uyl in E. Regis, Jr., ed., Gewirth's
Ethical Rationalism (Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984).
“Socialism as Reactionism,” in Kurt Leube and Albert Zlabinger, eds., The Political
Economy of Freedom: Essays in Honor of F. A. Hayek (Munchen, Germany:
Philosophia Verlag, 1984), 47-60.
“Property Rights and the Decent Society,” in J. K. Roth and R. C. Whittemore, eds.,
Ideology and American Experience (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute
Press, 1986), 121-153.
“Rights and Myths at the Workplace,” in Gertrude Ezorsky, ed., Moral Rights in the
Workplace (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1987), 45-50
“The Classical Egoist Basis of Capitalism,” in Tibor Machan, ed., The Main Debate
(New York: Random House, 1987), 139-161.

“L'etica del mercato (The Ethics of the Market),” in E. Sogno, ed., I. Liberalismi
Vincenti (Torino, Italy: Centro Studi Manlio Brosio, 1985).
“Ethics and Political Economy,” in Tibor Machan, ed., Commerce and Morality
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988).
“Government Regulation,” in Tibor Machan, ed., Commerce and Morality (Totowa,
NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988).
“Economic Analysis and the Pursuit of Liberty,” in Michael A. Walker, ed., Freedom,
democracy and economic welfare (Vancouver, BC: The Fraser Institute, 1988)
“The Uses of Ethics,” in Tibor Machan, ed., Commerce and Morality
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988).
“Ethics vs. Coercion: Morality or Just Values?” in Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., et al.,
ed., Man, Economy and Liberty (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1988).
“The Morality of Markets,” in Thomas R. Dye, ed., The Political Legitimacy of
Markets and Governments (New York: JAI Press, 1989).
“A Virtually Perfect Document: Rights & the U.S. Constitution,” in C. B. Gray, ed.,
Philosophical Reflections on the United States Constitution (Lewiston, NY:
The Edwin Mellen Press, 1989).
“On Teaching Business Ethics,” (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Lecture #253, May 1, 1990)
“What We Should Teach the Eastern Europeans,” in A World Without Walls
(Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Foundation for Economic Education, 1990)
“Rescuing Victims - From Social Theory,” in D. Sank & D. I. Caplan, eds., To Be A
Victim (New York: Plenum Press, 1991)
“How to Understand Eastern European Developments,” in Robert McGee, ed., The
Market Solution to Economic Development in Eastern Europe (Lewiston, NY:
The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992).
“Welfare State is Grossly Misnamed,” in Robert McGee, ed., Converting to a Market
Economy in Eastern Europe (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992)
“What We Should Teach the Eastern Europeans,” in Robert McGee, ed., Recent
Changes in the Economies of Eastern Europe (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen
Press, 1992)
“The Nonexistence of Basic Welfare Rights,” in James Sterba, ed., Justice: Alternative
Political Perspectives (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1992)
“Teaching Business Ethics in an Academic Environment,” in Robert W. McGee, ed.,
Business Ethics and Common Sense (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1992)
“The Nonexistence of Basic Welfare Rights,” in Steven Jay Gold, Moral Controversies:
Race, Class, and Gender in Applied Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publ. Co., 1993)
“Do Animals Have Rights?” in William H. Shaw, ed., Social and Personal Ethics (Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1993).
“Should All Persons Perform National Service?” in Mark Spangler, ed., Clichés of Political
Control (Irvington on Hudson, NY: The Foundation for Economic Education, 1994)
“Must the Government Guarantee a Job for Everyone?” in Mark Spangler, ed., Clichés of
Political Control (Irvington on Hudson, NY: Foundation for Economic Education, 1994)
“To Solve Problems, do we Need Government Regulations? in Mark Spangler, ed., Clichés of
Political Control (Irvington on Hudson, NY: Foundation for Economic Education, 1994)
“Capitalism, Socialism and Ecology,” in Hans Sennholz, ed., Man and Nature (Irvington on
Hudson, NY: Foundation for Economic Education, 1994)
“Justice, Self and Natural Rights,” in James Sterba, et al., Morality and Social Justice:
Alternative Views (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995)
“A Defence of Property Rights and Capitalism,” in Brenda Almond, ed., Introducing Applied
Ethics (Oxford, England: Blackwell, 1995)
“Do Animals Have Rights?” in Jeffrey Olen and Vincent Barry, eds., Applying Ethics (Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1996)

“The Non-Existence of Welfare Rights,” T. R. Machan & Douglas Rasmussen, eds., Liberty for
the 21st Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995)
“Business Ethics in a Free Society,” T. R. Machan & Douglas Rasmussen, eds., Liberty for the
21st Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995)
“Feminism Harms Women's Perceptions of Men,” Feminism: Opposing Viewpoints, in Wekesser, Carol,
ed., San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1995.
“The Non-Existence of Welfare Rights,” Lawrence Hinman, ed., Contemporary Moral Issues
(Upper Saddle Rovert, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1996)
“Capitalism,” in J. J. Chambliss, ed., Philosophy of Education: An Encyclopedia (New York:
Garland, 1996)
“Libertarianism,” Philosophy of Law, An Encyclopedia, C. B. Gray, ed. (Lewiston, NY:
The Edwin Mellen Press, 1996).
“Coping with Smoking,” in the Newsweek Education Program, More Controversial Issues (New
York: NewsSource Unit, 1996)
“Egoism, Psychological Egoism and Ethical Egoism,” P. H. Werhane & R. F. Freedman, eds.,
The Encyclopedia of Business Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996)
“Libertarianism & Business Ethics,” op. cit., The Encyclopedia of Business Ethics.
“Interview on Egoism,” in L. M. Hinman, Ethics: A Plural Approach (Harcourt Brace College, 1997).
“The Ethics of Advertising,” Wittgenstein, Applied Ethics (Kirchberg-an-Wechsel,
Austria: Austrian Wittgenstein Congress, 1998)
“Human Rights, Workers’ Rights, and the ‘Right’ to Occupational Safety,” in D. M. Adams
& E. L. Maim, eds., Business Ethics for the 21st Century (Mt. View, CA: Mayfield
Publishing Company, 1998).
“Business Ethics in a Free Society,” Blackwell Companion to Business Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).
“The Injustices of Affirmative Action,” Robert W. McGee, ed., Commentaries on Law & Public Policy
(South Orange, NJ: Dumont Institute, 1999)
“Buchanan is Dead Wrong: ‘Economic Patriotism’ Translates to Old-Fashioned Protectionism,” Donald S.
Will, et al., eds., The Global Citizen (Needham Heights, MA: Pearson Publishing, 1999).
“Human Rights, Workers’ Rights, and the ‘Right' to Occupational Safety” in W. Michael Hoffman,
Robert Frederick, and Mark Schwartz, eds., Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate
Morality (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001)
“Morality and Smoking,” David Benetar, ed., Ethics for Everyday (NY: McGraw-Hill, 2001).
“Libertarianism and Justice,” in John Arthur, ed., Morality and Moral Controversies 8th ed. (Upper
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“Do Animals Have Rights?” in S. M. Cahn, ed., Philosophy for the 21st Century (NY: Oxford UP, 2003)
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“Business Ethics in a Free Society,” in Parth J. Shah, Morality of Markets (New Delhi: Academic
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“The Whole Truth or Only Some of the Truth?” (ibid)
“What is Morally Right with Insider Trading?” (ibid)
“Egoism, Psychological Egoism and Ethical Egoism,” P. H. Werhane & R. F. Freedman, eds.,
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“Environmentalism Humanized,” in Anand Jayprakash Vaidya, ed., Business and Professional
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“Is Agreement Enough?” in Malcolm Murray (ed.), Liberty, Games and Contracts: Jan
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“Human Rights: Some Points of Clarification,” Journal of Critical Analysis, Vol. 5,
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“Nozick and Rand on Property Rights,” The Personalist, 58 (1977), 192-195.
“Belief Within the Thought of Pierre Bayle,” Folia Humanistica, Vol. 16, (1978),
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“Some Normative Considerations of Deregulation,” Journal of Social, Political and
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“Essentialism Sans Inner Natures,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 10, (1980),
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“Rational Choice and Public Affairs,” Theory & Decision, Vol. 12, (1980), 229-258.
“Some Recent Work in Human Rights Theory,” American Philosophical Quarterly,
Vol. 17 (1980), 103-115.
“Wronging Rights,” Policy Review, No. 17, 1981, 37-58.
“Some Philosophical Assumptions of National Labor Policy,” Harvard Journal of Law
and Public Policy, Vol. 4 (1981), 67-160.
“The Non-Rational Domain and the Limits of Economic Analysis: Comment,”
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“Epistemology and Moral Knowledge,” Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 36 (1982),
23-49.
“The Politics of Medicinal Anarchism,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12
(1982), 183-189.
“A Reconsideration of Natural Rights Theory,” American Philosophical Quarterly,
Vol. 19 (1982), 61-72.
“Individualism & the Problem of Political Authority,” The Monist, Vol. 66 (1983),
500-516.
“Ethics, Professionalism and Public Service,” Business and Professional Ethics Journal,
Vol. 2 (November 1983), 83-89.
“Ethics and the Regulation of Professional Ethics,” Philosophia, Vol. 13 (1983),
337-348.
“Recent Work on the Concept of Happiness,” with Den Uyl, American Philosophical
Quarterly, Vol. 21 (1984), 1-31.
“Some Ontological Considerations of Skinnerism,” Cogito, Vol. 3 (1985), 42-72.
“Another Look at Naturalist Ethics and Politics,” Cogito, Vol. 3 (1985), 75-114.
“Some Doubts About Animal Rights,” Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 19 (1985), 73-75.
“Is There A Right to Be Wrong?” International Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 2,
(1985), 105-09.
“Aiding A Suicide Attempt,” Criminal Justice Ethics, Vol. 4 (Winter 1986), 73-74.
“The Virtue of Freedom in Capitalism,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 3 (1986),
49-58.
“Metaphysics, Epistemology and Natural Law Theory,” American Journal of
Jurisprudence, Vol. 31 (1986), 65-77.
“Recent Work in Business Ethics,” with Den Uyl, American Philosophical Quarterly,
Vol. 24 (April 1987), 107-124.
“Advertising: The Whole Or Only Some of the Truth,” Public Affairs Quarterly,
Vol. 2 (1987), 59-71.
“Towards A Theory of Natural Individual Human Rights,” New Scholasticism, Vol.
61, No. 1 (Winter, 1987), 33-78.
“Corporate Commerce vs. Government Regulation: The State & Occupational Health
and Safety,” Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy, Vol. 2 (Fall
1987), 791-823.
“Terrorism and Objective Moral Principles,” International Journal of World Peace, Vol. IV, No. 4 (Oct- Dec. 1987), 31-40.
“Are Teleological Rights Theories Utilitarian?” Cato Journal, Vol. 7 (Spring/Summer
1987), 255-58.
“The Unavoidability of Natural Law and Rights,” Modern Age (Winter, 1987), 38-44.
“A New Individualist Defense of the Free Market,” International Review of Economics
& Ethics, Vol. 2 (1987), 27-39.
“Should Cigarette Advertising Be Banned?” with Den Uyl, Public Affairs Quarterly,
Vol. 2 (1988), 19-30.
“Harman's 'Refutation' of Flourishing Ethics,” Thomist, Vol. 49 (1985), 387-391.
“Moral Myths and Basic Positive Rights,” Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 33
(1985), 35-41.
“A Neglected Argument Against Theism,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. II
(1988), 48-52.
“The Morality of the Market Process,” Florida Policy Review (Summer 1988), 27-34.
“The Fantasy of Glasnost,” International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 16 (1989),
46-53.
“Are Human Rights Real?” Review Journal of Philosophy & Social Science, Vol. 13
(1988), 1-22.
“Individual versus Subjective Values,” International Journal of Social Economics, Vol.
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“Is Natural Law Ethics Obsolete?” Vera Lex (Vol. 9, No. 1: 1989)
“Rhetoric, Freedom and Capitalism,” Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 6 (1989)
“Natural Rights Liberalism,” Philosophy and Theology, Vol. 4 (Spring 1990), 253-65.
“La Etica de la Privatizacion,” Estudios Publicos, No. 37 (Verano 1990), 139-45.
“Politics and Generosity,” Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 7 (1990), 61-73.
“Exploring Extreme Violence (Torture)” The Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 21
(Spring 1991), 92-7.
“Sobre los derechos humanos,” Libertas, Vol. 8 (May 1991), 39-114.
“Do Animals Have Rights?” Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 5 (April 1991), 163-173.
“Teaching Business Ethics in an Academic Environment of Mistrust,” Mid-Atlantic Journal
of Business, Vol. 27 (March 1991), 59-65.
“Pollution, Collectivism and Capitalism,” Journal des Economists et des Estudes Humaines,
Vol. 2 (March 1991), 83-102.
“Classical Liberalism and the Market Economy,” Spekuliantas, Vol. 3 (Winter 1992), 32-41.
“The Status of the Victim in Social Theory,” Filozofia Istrazivaja, Vol. 41 (1991), 489-97.
“Politics and Ideology: Do Ideas Matter?” The Mid-Atlantic Journal of Business, Vol.
28 (June 1992), 159-167.
“How to Understand Eastern European Developments,” Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol.
6 (1992), 24-34.
“Evidence of Necessary Existence,” Objectivity, Vol. 1 (Fall, 1992), 31-62.
“Between Parents and Children,” Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 23 (Winter, 1992),
16-22.
“The Right to Private Property,” Critical Review, Vol. 6 (1992), 81-90.
“The Right to Privacy vs. Uniformitarianism,” Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 24
(1993), 76-84.
“Applied Ethics and Free Will,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 10 (1993), 59-72.
“Liberalisme et valeurs morales,” Liberte, economique et progres social, No. 67 (March
1993), 19-30.
“Some Reflections on Richard Rorty's Philosophy,” Metaphilosophy, Vol. 24 (January/
April 1993), 123-135.
“Environmentalism Humanized,” Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 7 (April 1993), 131-147.
“Individual Rights versus the Community, the Case of Environment “ International
Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 20 (1993), 54-65.
“Ayn Rand versus Karl Marx,” International Journal of Social Economics Vol. 21,
Nos. 2/3/4 (1994)
“What Remains of Communism Today?” International Journal of Social Economics
Vol. 21, Nos. 2/3/4 (1994)
“Individualism, Morality and the Free Market,” Journal des Economists et des Estudes
Humaines, Vol. 4 (Juin/Septembre 1993), 363-376.
“Professional Responsibilities of Corporate Managers,” Business and Professional Ethics
Journal, Vol. 13 (Fall, 1994), 57-69.
“Human Rights Reaffirmed,” Philosophy, Vol. 69 (1994), 479-489.
“Posner’s Rortyite (Pragmatic) Jurisprudence,” American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 40
(1995), 1-15.

“A Revision on the Doctrine of Disability of Mind,” Persona y Derecho, Vol. 33 (May 1995).
“Individualism and Classical Liberalism,” Res Publica, Vol. 1 (1995), 3-23.
“Reason in Economics versus Ethics,” International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 22,
No. 7 (1995), 19-37.
“Individualism and Political Dialogue,” Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Sciences and
the Humanities, Vol. 46 (1996), 9-22.
“Indefatigable Alchemist: Richard Rorty’s Radical Pragmatism,” The American Scholar
(Summer 1996)
“What is Morally Right with Insider Trading?” Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 10 (April 1996),
135-142.
“Communication from One Feminist,” Journal of Social Philosophy (Spring 1997)
“Does Libertarianism Imply a Welfare State,” Res Publica Vol. III, No. 2 (Autumn 1997)
“Why it Appears that Objective Ethical Claims Are Subjective,” Philosophia, Vol. 26,
Nos. 1-4 (1997) 1-23.
“For Individual Rights,” Modern Age (Spring 1997).
“Two Paths to Liberalism,” Partisan Review (Spring 1997).
“Blocked Exchanges Revisited,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol 14, No. 3 (1997), 249-262.
“The Normative Basis of Economic Science,” Economic Affairs, Vol. 18 (June 1998), 43-46.
“Immigrating into a free society,” J. of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (September 1998), 199-204.
“The Ethics of Advertising,” Proceedings of the Wittgenstein Symposium, 1998 (p. 49)
“Moral Values and Economic Science,” Chapman University Economic & Business Review
(June 1999), 30-32.
“The Metaphysics, Ethics and Politics of Environmentalism,” Interdisciplinary Environmental
Review Vol. I, No. 1 (1999), 23-32.
“Revisiting The Tragedy of the Commons,” Hoover Digest (June 1999)
“A Primer on Military Ethics,” Philosophy Today (September 1999).
“Entrepreneurship and Ethics,” International J. of Social Economics Vol. 26 (5&6) (1999), 596-608
“Defending a Free Society,” Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 33, No. 4 (December 1999), 451-455.
“Why Agreement is not Enough,” Philosophia, Vol. 28, Nos. 1-2 (2000)
“Egoism and Benevolence,” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 2000), 281-89.
“Introduction: Liberty and Hard Cases,” Symposium in Journal des Economists et des Estudes Humaines
Vol. 10 (December 2000), 469-74.
“Reflections in the Right to Private Property, “Journal des Economists et des Estudes Humaines, Vol 11
(March 2000).
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Politics (Summer 2001), 612-24.
“Liberalism and Atomistic Individualism,” Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 34 (Sept. 2000), 227-47.
“An Element of Business Ethics: Bribes and Kickbacks,” Chapman U. Economic & Business Review
(Summer 2000)
“Another Look at Abortion,” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring 2001), 449-56.
“Teaching Ayn Rand's version of Ethical Egoism,” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall
2001)
“The promise of the E-conomy for Freedom: Cautions from the Broader Perspective of
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“Anarchism and Minarchism, A Rapprochement,” Journal des Economists et des Estudes Humaines
Vol. 14, No. 4 (December 2002), 569-588.
“Why Globalization is Good—Some Reflections on the Ethics of Globalization,” Global Business &
Economics Review, Volume 3, Number 2 (December 2001), 186-199.
“Free Will Reconsidered,” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Vol. 4, Number 1 (Fall 2002).

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[Carl E. Olson]

Dr. Machan: Impressive. But it doesn't really explain why you misread Benedict XVI's encyclical so badly...

[Tibor R. Machan]

I disagree that I did. I think there is a lot of useless, even very hazardous, idealism in what he says about capitalism and free markets. Sure, he isn't a flat out enemy of freedom but as most Catholics, e.g., Michael Novak, he likes freedom only when freedom is guaranteed to lead to goodness.

[Mark Brumley]

he likes freedom only when freedom is guaranteed to lead to goodness

Hmmm. I don't remember reading that in Benedict, nor is it a valid inference from what he has written.

"Guaranteed to lead to goodness?" Really?

And some of the other things you say about Benedict! I don't recognize him, even though I've read a great deal of his work.

As much as I am impressed by the list of your works, I think the readers here would likely have been more enlightened about your position if you had taken up the space with an argument rather than an inventory.

But we probably start from such fundamentally different points that it would be difficult in the space here to have a useful discussion.

Certainly, if I have first to read the corpus of your writings I doubt I would get around to framing a sentence before they have to cart me off to the old folks home. Too bad disputes about truth cannot be resolved simply by ascertaining who has the more impressive list of published works. In many instances it would eliminate the need for tedious discussions and carefully-crafted arguments. How much easier life would be.

[Tibor R. Machan]

I wrote a column. Some folks seemed to want to know more about my stance, so I gave them a list of my works that include much more than a short, roughly 700 word, newspaper column can. Obviously no one is expected to suddenly do a study of my stuff but those not satisfied with a column have more to look at now, should they choose to do so.

[Carl E. Olson]

Some folks seemed to want to know more about my stance, so I gave them a list of my works that include much more than a short, roughly 700 word, newspaper column can...

I just wanted to know why you misrepresented Benedict's views on a number of key issues. Now I'm curious as to why you won't defend or explain your remarks, but instead flow in a lengthy list of your articles. If you cannot explain or defend what you wrote, why write it?

[W.]

Since Machan did not respond with an argument or analysis of the text of the Pope's work, perhaps he is basing his interpretation and column on the reviewer's work (and interpretation)?

And if the reviewer has some things wrong or not complete (as many have done with this text), then Machan's interpretation may be unreliable.

From what he said in the column, I don't think he interprets the Pope correctly. The Pope does not promote an idealistic love. The Pope proposes a realistic love rooted in an encounter with Christ.

"But the deeper love that the Pope and so many others, among them most notably Karl Marx, demand of us all (in opposition to self-love and a measured respect we show other people in the course of trade) is impossible except among intimates--family, friends, maybe some comrades in arms and colleagues. That kind of love requires detailed knowledge of others and such knowledge is simply unavailable to us except about very few other people (not all of whom, moreover, will deserve our love)."

Perhaps it is a metaphysical difference or difference of Catholic/non-Catholic view of love/charity. The Pope's view of love is not impossible. People have been living it each and every day for a couple thousand years.

When I encounter someone in the street or a student in the classroom (even on the first day of classes), my response to their presence before me is not dependent upon a "detailed knowledge" of them. No, they are a person and my ability to be charitable towards them, to love them, is not only possible but it is inevitable for the Christian who lives with the memory of Christ as a presence within and before them.

For a testimony of such love, see this letter from Traces magazine: “THE WAY YOU LOOK
AT ME IS DIFFERENT.”

For what it is worth, I have read Machan off and on for some years now, being the libertarian-leaning, freedom-loving American I am. Though I do agree with many of his policy positions, I do think there is a metaphysical difference underlying his thought and a more Thomistic way of thinking, not to mention the many readers of this site.

[Tibor R. Machan]

Well, having encountered students for forty plus years in the class room, I have not felt charity toward them unless on rare occasions they were in dire straights and needed my nonprofessional help. I have, of course, regarded them all as possessing the potential to learn and to make the most of what they learn. In a few cases I got to know them well enough to feel close to them because of certain affinities between us. But I have never felt it appropriate to simply show them indiscriminate love--indeed, I regard doing that as an insult, as demeaning them, as a kind of positive prejudice, if you will. Love must be earned, it shouldn't be just thrown around as if it grew on trees. The unconditional love being spoke of here is, as far as I understand things, unhealthy and breeds recklessness to boot.

[Tibor R. Machan]

Oh, and though I am more an admirer of Aristotle than of Aquinas, the latter has taught me a thing or two about epistemology and even economics.

[Janny]

Loving one's students is an insult?
That explains a whole lot of what's wrong with the university today. :-)
And I can't help but cringe at a learned person not knowing how to spell the phrase "dire straits."

(sigh)

JB

[W.]

It seems most of us here have a different understanding of love than Machan. The Thomistic view of love is "to will the good of the other." To always will the good of the other. Love is not merely to feel nice and affectionate towards another. So perhaps that would help rectify the difference. The love he is speaking of in his latest comment is not the love of the Tradition.

As well, it would be helpful if Machan would cite texts from the Pope that support his interpretation.

[Matthew Wade]

"Well, having encountered students for forty plus years in the class room, I have not FELT charity toward them unless on rare occasions they were in dire straights and needed my nonprofessional help. I have, of course, regarded them all as possessing the potential to learn and to make the most of what they learn. In a few cases I got to know them well enough to FEEL close to them because of certain affinities between us. But I have never FELT it appropriate to simply show them indiscriminate love--indeed, I regard doing that as an insult, as demeaning them, as a kind of positive prejudice, if you will. Love must be earned, it shouldn't be just thrown around as if it grew on trees. The unconditional love being spoke of here is, as far as I understand things, unhealthy and breeds recklessness to boot."

Although you've read and written much on Aristotle, and perhaps Aquinas, you've not gotten the distinction between a "feeling" and a "choice", passio et ratio, emotion and spontaneous motion. The "love" of feeling ought to be refined and tempered. But Love must be thrown around as if it grew on trees, even as if it filled every space, crevice, and cranny in the universe. It's only with this attitude that we will stop filling volumes and megabytes of space with articles, and find the truth that Pope Benedict XVI recognized, and you have so carelessly and dangerously missed.

Sincerely,

Matthew Wade

[achilles]

Tibor, the sticks of truth you may have had a shot at propping up an argument have been crushed under an astonishingly immense load of will to power information. You have mistaken quantity for quality and make such arrogantly ignorant statements about Pope Benedict that I seriously question your literacy skill and, more importantly, your motives.

[Tibor Machan]

Character assassination is no subtitute for argument, Mr. Achilles (which I have given, albeit succinctly in all my posts above except where I provide information). So if you cannot do any better than this stuff you produce in your Monday 1:16 PM post, just leave it all be and enjoy your pious self-satisfaction.

[W.]

Dr. Machan,

While I don't support critiques that insult personally or question your motives or allege a lack of literacy skills, I don't think you have yet responded to the main issue: what the Pope actually wrote.

You said, "Character assassination is no subtitute for argument, Mr. Achilles (which I have given, albeit succinctly in all my posts above except where I provide information)."

I have not yet seen an argument based on what Pope Benedict wrote. As stated above, most of us have responded because we think you have misinterpreted or misrepresented what the Pope wrote. We have asked, and continue to ask, for you to support your claims above (mentioned in previous comments too by some of us) with actual citations from the Pope's letter.

If you are relying upon some columnist for the interpretation, realize he may have it wrong and therefore your own take may be based on an erroneous presentation of the encyclical. If that is the case, just say you relied on someone who may have it wrong. We all can move on from there.

If not, please support your claims with evidence from the actual text.

If you are unwilling to do so, fine, but many will just interpret that as you not being able or willing to support your criticism of the Pope.

If your opinions of the encyclical were formed from a reading of the text, then it should not be too hard to find passages that support your claims. If they were not, then a scholar of your stature should not be publishing reviews/analysis without having first read and studied the actual document.

For what it is worth, as I said above, I say all this as someone who has read your works off and on over the years through various publications (Orange County Register) and involvement with like-minded groups (IHS, Young America's Foundation, FEE).

[Carl E. Olson]

Well said, W. I concur completely. I was not familiar with Dr. Machan's impressive CV prior to writing my post. If so, it wouldn't have caused me to change my comments at all, but would have left me even more puzzled about his critique of Benedict's encyclical. My guess is that much or most of what Dr. Machan wrote was indeed based on the article in The New Republic. Hopefully he will clarify the matter.

[Tibor R. Machan]

Here is what I wrote: "In his recent book, 'Caritas in Veritate: On Integral Human Development in Charity and Truth' (Ignatius Press, 2009), we are implored by the Pope to love all, instead of trade, as if this really were possible among billions of people." No one has shown this to be a misrepresentation and most have simply said I am wrong to dispute it. Yes, the Pope doesn't want to ban trade or even to condemn it completely but he implores us to love everyone instead of merely trade with them. I disputed this by noting that we cannot--nor should we try to--love everyone and trading with others embodies an acknowledgement of them as human beings, which all deserve.

[Mark Brumley]

Dr. Machan, I really don't want to come across to you as trying to pick a fight. However, I have to say that your language strikes me as awfully imprecise for one making a controversial formulation.

You say that you wrote, "We are implored by the Pope to love all, instead of trade, as if this really were possible among billions of people." Then you say, "Yes, the Pope doesn't want to ban trade or even to condemn it completely but he implores us to love everyone instead of merely trade with them."

But to "love all, instead of trade" is not the same thing as "to love everyone instead of merely [to] trade with them."

And I suspect we would have a similar difficulty plowing through what we mean by "love" and the sense in which the Pope can be understood as urging us to love "everyone", but perhaps I am mistaken.

When you refer to acknowledging others as human beings and you state that this is something "which all deserve", I think the Pope would see such a universally deserved acknowledging as a kind of love, a form of valuing the other and willing his good. Not the only kind of "love", not the highest kind of "love" but a kind of love.

[Mark Brumley]

BTW, I agree, Dr. Machan, that people should avoid the ad hominem here. Let's stick to arguments, folks.

[Tibor R. Machan]

Thanks for the conversation but now other tasks call.

[Martha]

So, by Dr. Machan's rule, if he is lying in the street bleeding to death and one of his students passes by, that student should keep on going because it's not part of their 'trade' (exchanging teaching hours in lectures for fees) that the student should care about Dr. Machan's health.

Sure, why not? Indeed, if the student thinks it likely, or even a possibility, that a better teacher will get Dr. Machan's job should he bleed to death in the gutter, it is positively imperative that the student not interfere! Because that means that the student - by having a better teacher - would be getting more value for his fee money!

[achilles]

Dr. Machan, I apologize for my knee jerk reaction to your interpretation, it was just that, a knee jerk and ill formed response. I should not have responded like that and I can assure you, I am not enjoying any kind of self-righteous piety. The baseness of my response to you would make self-righteous piety impossible. Please forgive my outburst. Achilles

[Tibor R. Machan]

What Martha says above is really quite wrong. In Aristotle's eudaimonistic ethics generosity is a moral virtue, as it is in ethical egoistic ethics which I consider the soundest. It is just not the primary moral virtue, which is right reason.