Was Fr. Hans Urs von Balthasar a heretic?

R.R. Reno, associate professor of theology at Creighton University, takes a look at that oft- and hotly-debated question in a post on the First Things blog:

Enter Paul Griffiths. The current issue of the theological journal Pro Ecclesia features a helpful essay by Griffiths, a Duke professor and First Things contributor: “Is There a Doctrine of the Descent into Hell?” (Summer 2008). With his usual care, Griffiths assesses the main claim about the orthodoxy of Balthasar’s theology put forward by Alyssa Lyra Pitstick in Light in Darkness: Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Catholic Doctrine of Christ’s Descent into Hell (Eerdmans, 2007).

Griffiths brackets the thorny question of how to interpret Balthasar, whose vivid biblical imagery and brilliant conceptual formulations do not lend themselves to easy summary. His focus is formal. He wishes only to query whether or not there is a magisterial teaching on Christ’s descent that can be used to assess the orthodoxy of Hans Urs von Balthasar.

Griffiths focuses on two elements of Pitstick’s distillation of the tradition. One has to do with the purpose of Christ’s descent, while the other has to do with the mode. By Pitstick’s reckoning, the Church teaches that Christ’s descent was to “the limbo of the Fathers,” which is to say, to the patriarchs of the Old Testament, in order to liberate them. Moreover, this descent was “glorious” and involved no suffering on Christ’s part.

There can be no doubt that Balthasar’s own theology of Holy Saturday teaches otherwise. Inspired by the mystical visions of Adrienne von Speyr, Balthasar developed an extraordinarily vivid account of Christ’s descent into hell. Instead of entering hell in triumphant splendor so as to rescue the Israelites of old whose faith was awaiting completion, Balthasar envisions the crucified Son of God as a depth charge of divine life tossed into the abyss of dissolution. The more deeply the Son sinks into death, the more profoundly does the eventual, inevitable, and triumphant explosion of divine life reverberate.

So what are we to make of the obvious differences? Balthasar has Christ descending to what really amounts to the metaphysical depths of nothingness, while, according to Pitstick, the tradition teaches that Christ descends to “the limbo of the Fathers.” Balthasar goes to great lengths to dramatize the agony of separation as the dead Son descends ever farther from the everlasting life of the Father, and again the tradition seems to go in a different direction, emphasizing the invulnerable, triumphant divinity shared between Father and Son.

But hold on. Griffiths searches magisterial documents, and he finds that the term “the limbo of the Fathers” occurs only in a text by Pius VI from 1784. As he notes, “The term is not found in the 1992 Catechism, nor in the Catechism of the Council of Trent.” So, it turns out that “the limbo of the Fathers” may have a fine theological pedigree, but it has no obvious or stable place in the Catholic hierarchy of truth. In short, the idea that Christ descends to “the limbo of the Fathers” is part of a venerable Catholic theological tradition that invites reflection, discussion, and debate rather than compels assent.

Read the entire post, which includes links to articles and responses in First Things by Pitstick, Balthasar scholar Edward Oakes, S.J., and various readers.

For more on the life and work of von Balthasar, see his Ignatius Insight author page, which includes a full listing of his books published by Ignatius Press. Or visit BalthasarBooks.com.

Excerpts from the writings of Hans Urs von Balthasar:

• Introduction | From Adrienne von Speyr's The Book of All Saints
• The Conquest of the Bride | From Heart of the World
• Jesus Is Catholic | From In The Fullness of Faith: On the Centrality of the Distinctively Catholic
• A Résumé of My Thought | From Hans Urs von Balthasar: His Life and Work
• Church Authority and the Petrine Element | From    In The Fullness of Faith: On the Centrality of the Distinctively Catholic
• The Cross–For Us | From A Short Primer For Unsettled Laymen
• A Theology of Anxiety? | The Introduction to The Christian and Anxiety
• "Conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary" | From Credo: Meditations on the Apostles' Creed

  IgnatiusInsight.com articles about Hans Urs von Balthasar:

• Discerning What Is Christian | The Foreword to Hans Urs von Balthasar's   Engagement with God | Margaret M. Turek
• Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Tarot | Stratford Caldecott
• Love Alone is Believable: Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Apologetics | Fr. John R. Cihak
• Balthasar and Anxiety: Methodological and   Phenomenological Considerations | Fr. John R. Cihak
• Reading von Balthasar Together: An Interview with Adam Janke | Carl E. Olson

Comments

[brendon]

I will be honest and say that I do not understand how Christ could have suffered the pains of hell and separation from the Father.

There is no suffering of separation from God in the beatific vision which unites that saints to God. The hypostatic union unites the body and soul of the human nature of Christ to God in a way that is more perfect and intimate than even the beatific vision. Thus it seems to me that if there can be no suffering of separation from God in the beatific vision, then there certainly cannot be any in the hypostatic union.

Similarly, my understanding of the hypostatic union and of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity assuming a human nature is such that the existence of the human nature of Christ is the same as existence of the divine nature of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. If this is a correct understanding, then it would seem that Christ's soul could not suffer the pain of separation from the Father. For this would mean either that the Second Person of the Trinity would have been separated from the First Person, which would violate the principle of non-contradiction by causing the Word to be both God and not-God, which is absurd, or the soul of Christ would have been separated from the Word, which would cause the soul of Christ to cease to exist, destroying the human nature of Christ, a conclusion that seems contrary to faith.

[Rick]

My understanding of the hypostatic union and of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity assuming a human nature is such that the existence of the human nature of Christ is the same as existence of the divine nature of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity.

Brendon, are you arguing that Christ did not have a human existence? In Fr. Galot's The Person of Christ, Galot argues that that Christ must have a human existence in order to be fully human. The conciliar definition from Chalecedon on the person of Christ is that the there both a human essence and a human existence of Christ, which together comprise the human nature. Galot believes that if existence of the human nature of Christ is replaced by the esse of the Word then what results is a certain type of Monophysitism, or what he calls an existential Monophysitism. He argues that Chalcedon particularly wanted to avoid this type of heresy. Such a view that tends to state that Christ had only only a human existence may tend to confuse person and nature and err on the side of essence instead of person. Natures adheres in persons and such natures compromise the "field of possibilities" in which one exists. In Christ, the natures are united in the Person of Jesus, but each nature still has its own existence united in his personhood. Natures do not suffer, but persons do. Whether one agrees with Balthasar or not, Christ and all his actions are in terms of his person and not the natures, he suffers as a divine person which in no way affects or causes any change to the the divine nature. If a human existence is denied to the human nature, how can we hold him to be fully human? Such a defintion seems contrary to Chalcedon's declaration.

Peace,
Rick

[EricG]

I must say I find Professor Reno's implied dismissal/denial of the Catholic tradition on the subject to be a little disingenuous. I hope her views have been misrepresented due to time or article-length constraints.

I don't mean to come across abrasively, but I am appalled by her implication that the doctrine of the "limbo of the Fathers" received magisterial approbation only in 1784. It seems that she and Dr. Griffiths commit the fallacy of assuming that a doctrine is invented at a time a particular formulation is employed to express it.

The doctrine of the Harrowing of Hell is an ancient one, taught by all the early Fathers, contained in the liturgical texts of all the Catholic Churches, Eastern and Western, and is as much an infallible doctrine of the "ordinary and universal Magisterium" as much as anything else that possibly could be, like the inadmissibility of women to the priesthood.

If she, Fr. Oakes, and Dr. Griffiths have such a hard time tracing the development of this doctrine throughout church history, I'd like to direct her to such fundamental sources as Dr. Ludwig Ott's treatment in his Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, the Summa Theologica, the old Catholic Encyclopedia, and even Wikipedia. David W. Bercot addreses this in his Dictionary of Early Christian Beliefs, as does JND Kelly in his book Early Christian Doctrines.

Dr. Griffiths also appears to commit the fallacy of asserting that there is no magisterial pronouncement on a subject simply by pointing out that the Church in the exercise of her extraordinary magisterium has rarely if ever touched upon a subject. He forgets that the Church also teaches infallibly through her ordinary and universal Magisterium, and in ignoring this, or acting if it were not authoritative, he commits the same fallacy "liberal Catholic" dissenters do when they argue for the permissibility of abortion and contraception, on the grounds that their immorality has not been dogmatized by an ex cathedra pronouncement.

Finally, if one is going to defend a novel thesis by appealing to an authority, one is on much safer ground sticking to sources far older and venerable than a handful of theologians from the past thirty years, Ratzinger included. While tradition certainly is living and developing, development occurs in such a way that the definitive teaching of the past is not repudiated; rather, what is implicit is made explicit.

Doctrinal novelty is not justified just because it is embraced by Benedict XVI or John Paul II. History is rife with examples of Popes departing, in good faith, from orthodox teaching. Do I believe von Balthasar was a heretic? Of course not. But he lives and taught in a very confusing time in the Church, a time when many Catholic intellectuals got carried away in their speculatings and ruminations. Many of the Fathers were also guilty of such strayings, and these pitfalls will always be there for the brilliant to fall in. But Balthasar was not a heretic because, so far as I can tell, he always intended to be faithful to the Magisterium. Historically, the Church has had a very gratitous attitude even to separated heretics and schismatics who believed as they did in good faith and lived otherwise pious lives. (Several of these have made their way into approved Catholic calendars, long before Vaitcan II, whether Arian and Monophysite martyrs or certain Eastern Orthodox schismatics.)

In short: It is completely possible that von Balthasar, like Origen, taught material heresy, without being a formal heretic. May he rest in peace.

[brendon]

Whether one agrees with Balthasar or not, Christ and all his actions are in terms of his person and not the natures...

If acts are in terms of persons, then the existence of Christ must be the act of His divine personhood, since existence is the first act of any being, from which all other acts flow.

More to the point, saying that Christ has two acts of existence, a divine act of existence and a human act of existence, seems to be Nestorianism. A person is a subsisting individual of an intellectual nature. Human nature is intellectual by definition. The human nature of Jesus was instantiated in the particular. If the human nature also had its own act of existence, separate from the act of existence of His divine nature, then it would be a subsisting individual of an intellectual nature, i.e. a person. Thus Christ would be two persons, one human and one divine.

Human nature entails intellect by definition. Christ had to assume a particular instantiation of human nature rather than human nature in general, else all men would be Christ. Thus the only remaining way to deny Nestorianism is to deny that the human nature of Christ had its own individual subsistence, i.e. its own individual act of existence.

[Rick]

Christ had to assume a particular instantiation of human nature rather than human nature in general, else all men would be Christ.

Sorry, but that doesn't follow. You are confusing person and nature, person is what individuates and not the nature. Jesus could only have one act of existence in the Incarnation, the act of existence is distinct from his humanity possessing existence. Your view can tend toward Monophysitism as Galot argues. Do you "act/suffer" in your person or in your human nature? Jesus does not suffer or act in his humanity and divinity alone, he acts/suffers as a divine person. The Boethian defintion of person as an individual substance of a rational nature is minimalistic, the Church also affirms person as a subsisting relational subject in its declarations on the Trinity.

Aquinas came to such a view in De Unione (1271) as Christ possessing a human esse. He writes that there exists another esse to the subsistence of the person of the Son of God, which he calls a secondary esse because it exists in time. But, he is quick to state that this is not a two-fold being in Christ, but calls it “secondary being.” Here, as in previous works St. Thomas shows that the esse of the human nature of Christ is not that of the divine nature. Also, in addition to the eternal esse of the divine nature, there is an esse that belongs to the human nature and a principal and a secondary being. Nevertheless, he does admit to Christ have a human esse. This view is contrary to his ealier works. Galot states regarding the esse of Christ’s human nature, “To refuse to attribute a human esse to him is to affirm that his human nature does not exist as a human nature, and does not possess what it needs in order to exist.” When the Council of Chalcedon declared that Christ had two natures, it was an affirmation of two existing real natures. Nature cannot be identified without referring to essence, but with this there must also be a reference to existence. If these are separated, Galot states that this would be an interpretation in hindsight of the Council’s declaration, a distinction of which it had no understanding.

The Conciliar definition of the person of Christ consisted of both a human essence and a human existence of Christ, which together comprise the human nature of Christ. Galot believes that if existence of the human nature of Christ is replaced by the esse of the Word then what results is a certain type of Monophysitism, or what he terms an existential Monophysitism. The Council of Chalcedon particularly wanted to avoid this type of heresy. Monophysitisism holds that Christ has but a single nature that was divine. Like the Monophysites, the view that denies an actual human esse in Christ, also denies his human nature a concrete state of existence. While this type of existential Monophysitism upholds the duality of natures, it fails to say what is essential in regards to the human nature because it denies the concreteness of its existence. Thus, it also states that while the esse proper to the man Jesus is perfect, infinite and eternal, it follows that his human nature would be this way as well. An infinite “to be” or esse, is ascribed to a person that in his human nature has the mutability and limitations of a creature in all things except sin. It also denies Chalcedon’s clear teaching that the Messiah was a man who possessed a human nature in its entirety.

If a human esse in its concrete reality is denied to the Person of Christ in its union with the divine esse of the Word, then it also presents an obstacle to Jesus entering into a human nature, his consubstantiality with our nature. Jesus, as he is portrayed in the Gospels had a human existence in the deepest sense of the word. He enters into human time and becomes one of us. He experienced all the esse of being human, of all that characterizes the “to be” of human joy and suffering. His life was not merely the phenomenal illusion of a human life underlying the reality of a divine being. It was not some type of an ontological ecstasy whereby the truest reality was the beatific vision, but the simultaneity of the mystery that he was both God and man it all their concreteness. On the contrary, the Person of the Word assumed a human esse, and did not remove from his human nature what made it human. He made all of the nature part of himself including the human esse. No part of humanity was left out Christ’s Incarnation except sin.

IMO, any concept regarding the esse of Christ that neglects the human esse, either as an ecstasy of being or the limiting to a dinvine esse fails to justify the mystery of the Word incarnate and all its implications. Galot writes, “This approach (one that denies the concreteness of the human esse) limits the metaphysical depth of the mystery through the shear inability to tolerate the idea that a human “to be” can belong to a divine person."

[Mark Brumley]

For the record, R.R. Reno is a man.

[EricG]

Mr. Reno should make that clear by writing under a first name, and not an abbreviation. Duly noted for next time . . .

[brendon]

You are confusing person and nature, person is what individuates and not the nature.

No, "person" is an individual subsistence of an intellectual nature. "Person" is what you get when a specific kind of nature, an intellectual one, subsist in a per se and individual fashion. To say that "person" is what individuates natures is exactly backwards.

Do you "act/suffer" in your person or in your human nature?

Both, because I am only a man and thus the two are indistinguishable insofar as I subsist per se and individuated from other human beings.

Jesus does not suffer or act in his humanity and divinity alone, he acts/suffers as a divine person.

Jesus did not suffer in His divinity at all, since the divine essence is impassable and immutable. Jesus the divine person suffered in His human nature.

The Boethian defintion of person as an individual substance of a rational nature is minimalistic, the Church also affirms person as a subsisting relational subject in its declarations on the Trinity.

The relational definition of "person" is an analogous use of the Boethian definition as applied to the Trinity. See Matthew Levering's Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology. A divine person is a relation, individuated by opposition of origin, that subsists in an infinitely intelligent nature.

All that aside, however, I am willing to admit that, at the very least, I overstated what I was trying to say. For a human nature to exist it must possess an esse that is limited by the potentiality that is the essence of humanity. My wording leads one to assume that the assumption of a human nature by the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity in the Incarnation would require the divine esse itself to become limited by such a potentiality, which would have the effect of making God not be God.

What I was attempting to say is that the human nature of Jesus was brought into existence with a unique relationship to the divine essence and the person of the Son. If the hypostatic union were somehow to end, the human nature of Christ would cease to exist. The point being that if Jesus soul were to be separated from the divine essence, which would seem to be required for it to suffer the pains of hell, then His soul would cease to be. The mode of existence of the human nature if Jesus is as assumed by the Son and cannot exist apart from this assumption.

[Mark Brumley]

G.K. Chesterton, C.S. Lewis, J.R.R. Tolkien, E.I. Watkin, A. J. Cronin, and T.S. Eliot (to mention only a few) probably wouldn't agree with you, Eric. George Eliot, either.

On the other hand, R.A. Knox and F.J. Sheed might, depending on their mood. In Evelyn Waugh's case, it would depend on whether "he-Evelyn" or "she-Evelyn" were writing, the former being the more likely and celebrated referent.

Perhaps it is a sign of your gallantry that you presumed R.R. Reno was a woman. Or perhaps the name brought to mind another Reno and that generated the presumption of a women behind the designation.

[Mark Brumley]

Oh my. I leave the site alone for a bit and theology breaks out all over the place. What are we to do? The next thing you know we'll have critics about with their jargon, walks in Alpine regions and talk of free love, all in the name of art.

[Ed Peters]

Horrible jargon, Mark, critics with their horrible jargon.

That said, when folks like HUVB and a host of other big boys (and girls) start duking it out on universal salvific will, the best for me is at a safe distance.

[Mark Brumley]

It is complicated business to remain faithful to the theological tradition. To be sure, there is an infidelity that can arise as a result of heresy. But there is also an infidelity that can arise from confusing the theological formulations of an era, including their mixture of revelation itself and human attempts at exposition of revelation, with orthodoxy itself. The limitations of human systems can become obscure and people can confuse those systems with the revelation they seek to understand and expound. When that happens people are unfaithful to the Word of God, even though they think they are preserving the authentic understanding of it.

Because we believe in a Spirit-guided Tradition, we are not left to our own intellectual devices to work out how we should understand the Word of God in history, even though God does not generally spare us the hard work of thinking. The Magisterium can determine what is revealed and express the Word of God in enduring formulations (dogmas). But not everything the Church presents is presented as dogma and even dogma can "develop". A danger, then, remains--one of absolutizing the relative in theology out of our concern not to relativize the absolute.

[Evan]

Apart from the theological question itself being confusing, the conversation appears to have gotten even more convoluted by a misunderstanding of who is saying what.

As I understand it:

-Balthasar's theology of Christ's descent is the topic of conversation.

-Pitstick's recent book criticizing Balthasar on the descent is the particular interpretation with which the discussants are concerned.

-Griffiths comments on Pitstick (rejecting her criticism of Balthasar).

-Reno blogs about Griffiths' critique of Pitstick's critique of Balthasar, suggesting that speculative theology should be presented with more broadly applicable constraints than the ones that Griffith rather straightforwardly clears Balthasar of (contra Pitstick).

I'm assuming that Griffiths' recent piece is similar to or identical with the wonderful response he gave in San Diego at the AAR conference. I don't know if anyone else was there, but the Karl Barth Society of North America had a panel discussion on Pitstick's book with Paul Griffiths, John Webster, and David Lauber responding. If this is the case, then I'd have to say that while Reno's call (shared by some posters here) for a stricter standard of orthodoxy when dealing with speculative theology may be appropriate, it is unfair to criticize Griffiths on this count. He is simply responding to the charges that Pitstick brings against Balthasar, and if these charges are indefensibly narrow in their basis (attempting to rely merely on magisterial pronouncement), then it is her own fault and not Griffiths' for showing these standards to be inadequate to identify Balthasar as a heretic. On the other hand, if we do decide that a wider appeal to tradition is appropriate for judging heresy in speculative theology, then we also run into the problem of those aspects of tradition that support Balthasar... the point of a magisterial standard of orthodoxy is to arbitrate within the tradition, which is every bit as speculative as Balthasar's quite novel work on Holy Saturday. In the end, I don't know if a firm word on the matter could be obtained even if Reno's wish were granted concerning an appeal to broader standards of orthodoxy in theological work.

[EricG]

Evan:

On what grounds do you regard the Church 2000 year teaching, that Christ descended into Hades to apply his redemption to the souls of the just who lived before His coming, to be "speculative"? Not only do the Fathers and the Creed presuppose that it is an article of faith, but Christian piety and the universal liturgical tradition of the Catholic Churches, Eastern and Western, profess it unhesitatingly.

How is this not infallible teaching by virtue of the ordinary and universal magisterium?!

Geez, next we're gonna be told that it's alright to speculate that there is a Fourth Person in the Godhead, and it will be claimed that the Church has never explicitly said, ex cathedra, that there isn't . . .

Sure, Christ's Harrowing of Hell does not rank as high on the hierarchy of truths as the Godhead, but this constantly trying to be theologically novel, almost for novelty's sake, has got to end, as does this hermeneutic of deconstruction, where we take the words or traditional formulations of a dogma and give them meanings which, while perhaps linguistically justifiable, violate the manifest intention of the church which formulates them.

It's exactly what activist judges do who find a right to abortion in the Constitution.

[Evan]

I think you're reading too much into my mention of "speculative theology", Eric. You mention Ott's Fundamentals above... if he can say (§2.1.a) "The questions posed by the Schoolmen were exclusively those pertaining to speculative theology," then why not read my mention of the same as a benign statement of genre rather than a call for hypothesizing something like a fourth person of the Trinity?

You seem intent on burning witches here, having pitted creative theological work in toto against magisterium (with a reference to activist judges and abortion to boot!) I wonder what you think of Mark's last post about dogma, its limitations, and its development? I think he gets at the heart of the matter, and Griffiths isn't trying to say any more than he does here.

A serious reading of Balthasar should at least admit the fact that any "novelty" that might appear is certainly not for novelty's sake. I regret even using the term, in fact... I should have known that it would have been latched on to in this fashion.

[Tuppence]

You are all learned men, scholastics, theologians, and philosophers. I couldn't begin to discuss the points in your posts.

When I read the article, for the first time I realized that Father von Balthasar must be right. Our Lord suffered and died on the Cross. He suffered, He felt the separation from the Father and the Holy Spirit. When He died, all of His humanity did not go away. He was still Jesus Christ, Son of the Father, true God and true man. We cannot say that He could not have experienced the pains of Hell if we truly believe He suffered on the Cross.

Now, I don't understand the hypostatic union, any more than I understand the nature of the Trinity. (You don't either, although you think about it a lot; I just accept it. Way beyond my pay grade.)

When Our Lord descended into Hell (in the words of the Creed) he was gathering up the souls of the just. St. Joseph was waiting for Him, and I can't imagine St. Joseph having to undergo any further purification. But what about the others? What about people like us? What justifies us? Is it our deeds or our acceptance of Jesus as our Saviour? Isn't it both? Like the natures of the Lord, true God and true man, we must strive for perfection, but we must also believe in Jesus Christ. Wouldn't Our Lord, in His mercy, have given all souls the same opportunity? Look at the thief on the cross. Lived a lousy life, but recognized Jesus as the Son of God, Who then told him "You will be with Me this day in Paradise." (But I imagine the poor man needed a little cleaning up, if you get my drift.)

If Jesus descended into Hell only in triumph, what soul wouldn't recognize Him? But if He descended into Hell as Himself, subject to suffering, having died on the Cross, His divinity hidden from sight, wouldn't that be the true test for souls? We cannot get to Heaven without accepting Christ suffering. It is a very hard saying, and it is a stumbling block for us.

When I read this post, for the first time I realized the suffering Our Lord endured to rescue souls from Hell, from separation from the Father and the Holy Spirit. He humbled Himself to suffer and die on the Cross for us. Would he have done less for the souls waiting for Him? Or, in His infinite Mercy, would He have given the not-so-just souls an opportunity to be with Him in Paradise? He endured every other trial and temptation that we do, and more, so why would we assume that He wouldn't suffer the pains of Hell to rescue those who have gone before us?

Are we worthy of what He has done for us? I don't think we're even close, but blessedly He does, so that we all have the choice of whether or not to accept His love and His mercy, no matter how unworthy we are. Some of us will spend longer in purgatory than others, to make us fit to be in His prescence. Some of you will go straight to heaven. But I think that by beginning to realize the depth of His suffering and humility, including suffering the pains of Hell, we can begin to realize (and marvel at) the infinite depth of His Mercy.

[Mark Brumley]

One point to consider is Reno's brilliant image of the Lord's descent into hell as a divine depth charge. That helps express what Balthasar is trying to get at with his view of the descent as being part of what it means to say that Jesus died--that he was in the grave (not simply buried, in reference to his body, but that he "went down into the pit" of death) and that he tasted death, which is the consequence of sin. Of course glory and triumph follow. Balthasar does not deny that. However, he wants to deepen the reflection on what it means to say that Jesus died.

[EricG]

Let me ask this: Is von Balthasar's teaching compatible with the Church's ordinary and universal teaching that the person of Christ never left the right hand of the Father, even during His incarnate life?

[Deacon Harold]

Eric,

I'm not sure the Church teaches that "Jesus never left the right hand of the Father." The Catechism states:

659 "So then the Lord Jesus, after he had spoken to them, was taken up into heaven, and sat down at the right hand of God." Christ's body was glorified at the moment of his Resurrection, as proved by the new and supernatural properties it subsequently and permanently enjoys. But during the forty days when he eats and drinks familiarly with his disciples and teaches them about the kingdom, his glory remains veiled under the appearance of ordinary humanity. Jesus' final apparition ends with the irreversible entry of his humanity into divine glory, symbolized by the cloud and by heaven, where he is seated from that time forward at God's right hand.

660 The veiled character of the glory of the Risen One during this time is intimated in his mysterious words to Mary Magdalene: "I have not yet ascended to the Father; but go to my brethren and say to them, I am ascending to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God." This indicates a difference in manifestation between the glory of the risen Christ and that of the Christ exalted to the Father's right hand, a transition marked by the historical and transcendent event of the Ascension.

661 This final stage stays closely linked to the first, that is, to his descent from heaven in the Incarnation. Only the one who "came from the Father" can return to the Father: Christ Jesus. "No one has ascended into heaven but he who descended from heaven, the Son of man."

662 "and I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all men to myself." The lifting up of Jesus on the cross signifies and announces his lifting up by his Ascension into heaven, and indeed begins it. Jesus Christ, the one priest of the new and eternal Covenant, "entered, not into a sanctuary made by human hands. . . but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God on our behalf." There Christ permanently exercises his priesthood, for he "always lives to make intercession" for "those who draw near to God through him".

663 Henceforth Christ is seated at the right hand of the Father: "By 'the Father's right hand' we understand the glory and honour of divinity, where he who exists as Son of God before all ages, indeed as God, of one being with the Father, is seated bodily after he became incarnate and his flesh was glorified."

664 Being seated at the Father's right hand signifies the inauguration of the Messiah's kingdom, the fulfilment of the prophet Daniel's vision concerning the Son of man: "To him was given dominion and glory and kingdom, that all peoples, nations, and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom one that shall not be destroyed." After this event the apostles became witnesses of the "kingdom [that] will have no end".

[Jeff Grace]

EricG said:
---
"Let me ask this: Is von Balthasar's teaching compatible with the Church's ordinary and universal teaching that the person of Christ never left the right hand of the Father, even during His incarnate life?"
---

"The Church's ordinary and universal teaching" ... as opposed to the Church's extraordinary and specific teaching?

[Mark Brumley]

We need some precision.

When one says that the Son never left the right hand of the Father, what does that mean? Is that a statement of spatial location? And how does one fit that with the statement that the Son "came down from heaven"?

One will need to move beyond the picture talk if one is going to have a substantial theological discussion on a topic such as this.

[EricG]

I'll have to re-research this point, but I know for a fact that Church teaching holds that Christ always had the beatific vision, even in his passion, and that the Byzantine liturgical texts are explicit on this point. More later . . .

[Tuppence]

Christ is truly one in Being with the Father. He is truly God, the second Person of the Holy Trinity.

Christ is truly man. He was born of woman, lived, suffered, died and was buried for us.

Meditating on His Passion and death are so painful that the Church must remind us every year. We would much rather concentrate on the Resurrection. To follow His journey to Hell, as Father von Balthasar did, goes much further into the mystery of our salvation than most of us can bear to contemplate. He did it for love of us. He would have done the same thing for only one soul.

We think we know a lot about the nature of man; we know almost nothing about the nature of God. But, gentlemen, all your theological discussions must be founded upon the knowledge of this terrible, ruthless love that empties itself for another. The depth of His love and mercy are unknowable to us.

P.S. Don't forget, Lucifer couldn't understand why Christ would become man in the first place.

[Carl E. Olson]

My .02 worth: When I read von Balthasar's Mysterium Paschale, the only thing that melted faster than my brain was my heart. It's a profound work of theological and spiritual reflection.

[Tom]

One thing I agree with Ericabout: from Reno's report, Griffiths seems to be pushing Magisterial positivism. Eric is right that one can be a heretic without ever contradiciting an explicit teaching of a council or pope. Greater attention to the Fathers and doctors and the liturgies of east and west is required than word searching papal and conciliar documents.

[Rick]

Mysterium Paschale.....it's a profound work of theological and spiritual reflection.

As are so many of his books, epecially Heart of the World and Unless You Become Like This Child, humbling books from such a brilliant man. The same can be said for Von Speyr's works as well, IMO.

When people throw the "H" word around peope like Fr. vB, well, we should all be leery about trying to be more holy than the Church. As for greater attention being paid to the Tradition of the Church and Patristic writings, are there many scholars that knew them as well as vB?

[Mark Brumley]

It would be helpful if in a discussion of the ordinary and universal magisterium people went back to LG and reflected on what constitutes infallible teaching from the ordinary and universal magisterium.

[Evan]

"One thing I agree with Ericabout: from Reno's report, Griffiths seems to be pushing Magisterial positivism."

Again, I think a fairer reading would be that Griffiths is responding to Pitstick's "positivism". One can't blame him for rejecting a narrow understanding of authority for its lack of historical merit when he wasn't the one who proposed it, nor expect him to address the question of a comprehensive understanding of authority when that's simply not what he's responding to.

[DN]

I want to think there's as little to make about this as there apparently is to make about the universal salvation question, but this one makes me a little more wary.

That being said, many theologians, brilliant and gifted by God, are just plain wrong now and again. So it doesn't worry me that much.